Political Economy

The previous three parts have traced a grim continuity: from colonial plantations to Mexico’s IMMEX program to the special economic zones of Vietnam, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and beyond. In each case, foreign capital gains access to cheap labour, tax breaks, and unrestricted profit repatriation, while the host country receives low‑wage jobs but little industrial deepening. This is not development; it is extraction.

The Mexican IMMEX model did not emerge in isolation. It is one variant of a global policy template promoted by international financial institutions, bilateral donors, and development agencies since the 1980s. Today, dozens of countries operate Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and export‑processing zones (EPZs) that offer foreign investors the same deal: duty‑free imports, tax holidays, weak labour protections, and unrestricted profit repatriation. In exchange, they receive jobs – but rarely the kind of industrial deepening that builds self‑sustaining economies.

If the colonial plantation was the original extraction machine, Mexico’s IMMEX (Industria Manufacturera, Maquiladora y de Servicios de Exportación) program is its most sophisticated 21st‑century descendant. Launched in 2006 as a successor to the earlier maquiladora scheme, IMMEX now encompasses over 3,000 plants, employs more than 1 million workers, and accounts for roughly half of Mexico’s exports. Yet the economic structure remains eerily familiar: foreign ownership, low wages, minimal local value‑added, and a legal framework designed to repatriate profits rather than reinvest them.

The modern enthusiasm for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in developing countries often overlooks a troubling historical precedent. Before the era of global supply chains and special economic zones, there was the colonial plantation system. For centuries, European powers established enclave economies in Asia, Africa, and the Americas designed for one purpose: extraction.

A five-part series using Wintrobe's loyalty-repression model and Verwimp's commune-level data to show that the Rwandan genocide was not the explosion of ancient hatreds but the rational outcome of a budget constraint the dictator could no longer meet.

A five-part series examining why the countries best endowed with natural resources are so frequently the worst governed, and how the arithmetic of commodity dependence — not culture, not climate, not colonial history alone — explains the pattern.

Institutions at the edge of force

This three-part series examines how the United States turned democracy from a political principle into the moral packaging of imperial power. It traces the machinery beneath that language—institutions, law, finance, and force—and shows how these structures sustained hierarchy while preserving the image of universal order. It concludes by arguing that Trump did not create this contradiction, but exposed it by openly consuming the very myth America once sold to the world.